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Introduction 
 
 
Mali, the G5 and Security Sector Assistance: 
Political Obstacles to Effective Cooperation 
Denis M. Tull 
While the security situation in Mali and its border areas continues to deteriorate, the 
new “Force Conjointe” (FC) of the G5 Sahel states completed its first military operation 
in mid-November. Its aim is to make a regional contribution to the fight against terror-
ism and organized crime. A summit was held in Paris on 13 December to mobilise fur-
ther financial and equipment support for FC. Germany and the EU are strongly com-
mitted to this project alongside France. However, efforts to enhance regional armed 
forces are fraught with problems. International partners prefer a capacity-building 
approach geared to short-term success over security sector reform and lack a coordi-
nated strategy. The Malian government, on the other hand, preserves the status quo 
and is not prepared to accept its political responsibility. 
 
The Mali crisis began in 2012 with a sepa-
ratist rebellion in the north, followed by a 
military coup in the capital Bamako and 
the occupation of northern Mali by jihadist 
groups. Its repercussions have since reached 
neighbouring countries. The resulting 
strong military focus of local and inter-
national actors will be reinforced by the 
creation of the FC of the G5 Sahel countries 
(Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, 
Chad). International support for the force 
follows the well-known maxim “African 
solutions to African problems”. In relation 
to the FC this amounts to bilateral support 
for the armed forces in the region: training 
and equipment to bolster the capabilities 
of national and hence FC forces. This com-
plements an array of measures already 
under way, such as the EU’s training 
mission (EUTM Mali), which has been 
in existence since 2013. 
Capacity-Building in Place of 
Security Sector Reform 
Politically speaking, the preference for 
regional solutions is uncontroversial. It is 
less clear whether security sector assistance 
in the guise of train and equip projects of-
fers an efficient path. As an essentially tech-
nical approach in core operational areas, 
security sector assistance covers a wide range 
of measures from modest tasks (such as 
training and equipment for mine-clearing, 
snipers, logistic services) to complex opera-
tions. 
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However, the results to date are incon-
clusive. Mali’s security forces are probably 
in better shape today than they were at the 
time of the 2012 crisis, but the worsening 
security situation belies at best relative 
progress. The situation can only improve 
fundamentally if, among other things, ex-
ternal support moves beyond the current 
technical and tactical focus and, above all, 
is designed to be long-term and strategic; 
that is to say a structural reform of the 
security sector (army, police, justice). This 
must include aspects such as the fight 
against corruption (especially in procure-
ment); professionalisation of recruitment, 
human resources and career management 
procedures; and creation of effective struc-
tures in administration, logistics and the 
chain of command. Improved civil-military 
relations should also be an essential reform 
objective; at stake here are the primacy 
of politics, effective parliamentary control, 
the anchoring of democratic and consti-
tutional norms and human rights stand-
ards, etc. 
Since the early 2000s, several initiatives 
on security sector reform (SSR) have been 
launched in Mali, although none pro-
gressed much beyond the discussion stage. 
The 2012 crisis once again highlighted 
the urgency of an SSR, and the government 
elected in 2013 made SSR a priority. The 
Algiers peace accord of 2015 explicitly 
states the necessity for a profound SSR. 
However, as in other fields (such as the 
fight against corruption), the government 
has restricted itself to formal technical 
measures, such as setting up various bodies, 
including the Conseil National pour la 
Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité. Without 
political backing, however, they remain 
powerless. Everything suggests that the 
government gives clear priority to capacity-
building over structural reforms. Top of 
the list are procurement (weapons systems, 
helicopters, etc.) and recruitment, in line 
with the 2015 Loi d’orientation et de pro-
grammation militaire (LOPM), which pro-
vides for military expenditure of about 
€1.9 billion by 2019. 
Overall, the government has thus far 
shown little interest in substantive reforms 
aimed at professionalising the security sec-
tor. It shares this attitude to a large extent 
with its international partners. The pre-
carious security situation seems to guide 
responses on both sides, especially moves 
towards rapid capacity building, but it is 
unlikely to solve the security sector’s under-
lying governance problems. 
International Partners: 
Going It Alone 
External support for the Malian security 
sector (from UN, EU, bilateral partners) – 
whether deeper reform or just capacity-
building – can only be effective if it is based 
on shared goals and strategies. Today, al-
most six years into the crisis, this is the case 
to only a very limited extent. To be sure, 
international partners have massively in-
creased their aid. By the beginning of 2017, 
they were running no fewer than seventy 
different projects to assist Mali’s security 
sector (justice, defence, internal security). 
However, most of these initiatives were not 
based on concerted action, let alone a com-
mon strategy. 
There is little coordination between ex-
ternal actors and the Malian side. Accord-
ing to one Malian government official, 
international partners “do what they want 
and as they see fit” – without seeking the 
consent of local authorities. This perception 
deepens already considerable resentment 
against international players, and amplifies 
Malian complaints about international 
tutelage (“tutelle”) and loss of national sov-
ereignty. Some Malian observers self-criti-
cally concede that the government has 
so far failed to provide a framework into 
which the partners could fit – but they 
are arguably a minority in Bamako. 
There is also little in the way of coordi-
nation between international partners 
themselves, inevitably leading to overlap 
and duplication. The problem is highlight-
ed by the way some external actors pro-
claim “coordination” with other donors – 
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which should be a matter of course – as a 
distinct project goal. 
In addition, mechanisms for monitoring 
and evaluating training measures are in-
adequate, absent or simply beyond the abil-
ity of partners. For example, EUTM Mali has 
no means of evaluating the performance or 
knowing the whereabouts of soldiers who 
have undergone EUTM training. Indirect in-
sights are provided only by the French anti-
terrorist operation Barkhane, which accom-
panies Malian army units in action and can 
thus provide some feedback to EUTM. Most 
international partners lack solid evidence 
for the assumption that more training and 
equipment increases the effectiveness of 
Mali’s armed forces. The unintended con-
sequences of security sector assistance are 
also largely unknown. In light of the fore-
seeable acceleration in support for the G5 
FC and its contingents, monitoring and 
evaluation tools should be strengthened. 
Effective Armies: A Shared Goal? 
The policy of the international partners 
seems to follow the assumption that Mali 
and the other G5 countries are interested 
in building an effective security sector, in 
particular armed forces. Such a common in-
terest would vastly enhance the prospects 
of successfully strengthening and/or reform-
ing the security sector – yet its existence 
is doubtful, at least in the case of Mali, the 
epicentre of the regional crisis, but also in 
Niger. 
Firstly, it is questionable whether the 
Malian government possesses any incentive 
at all to strengthen and professionalise its 
army. Historically, it has tended to out-
source core state prerogatives. Delegation 
to intermediary actors is evident in social 
services, which are to a considerable extent 
provided by local and international non-
governmental organisations, and a similar 
situation can be observed in the security 
sector, where Bamako has repeatedly mobi-
lized local militias to fight rebels. 
On a larger scale, the French Operation 
Barkhane can also be regarded as an actor 
to which security management has been 
delegated. As long as this heavily armed 
4,000-strong mission is present in Mali, and 
in the other G5 countries, governments will 
likely consider it an effective security guar-
antee against possible threats, be they in-
surgents, jihadists or their own military. In 
other words, the political and military sup-
port of international partners encourages 
local governments to ignore the conse-
quences of their actions or non-actions. 
Secondly, troubled civil-military rela-
tions in Mali and Niger raise doubts as to 
whether their governments actually favour 
strong, professional armies. Since inde-
pendence in 1960, Mali and Niger have ex-
perienced five failed coups and seven suc-
cessful ones (most recently in Niger in 2010 
and in Mali in 2012). 
The influence of the military in the 
political arena is obvious, and considerable 
mistrust exists between civilian political 
elites and military leaders. Developing a 
professional and relatively autonomous 
military, independent of political influ-
ence, is therefore probably not in the inter-
est of governments. They tend to control 
the military by patronage and fragmenta-
tion wherever possible. The downside of 
this policy is decreasing combat effective-
ness. 
Denial of Political Responsibility 
Given the steadily deteriorating security 
situation in Mali and the Sahel, it may seem 
appropriate to focus outside assistance on 
the military and security forces in general. 
But this has also contributed to crowding 
out discussions about the socio-political 
dimensions of the crisis. These include the 
lack of public goods such as rule of law and 
social services, but also counterproductive 
crisis management. This is convenient for 
governments, which face great difficulties 
in meeting citizens’ expectations. By acci-
dent or design, the exclusive focus on secu-
rity threats shrinks public space for the 
articulation of such demands by citizens; 
security threats, the state of emergency and 
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rising expenditure in the security sector 
serve to legitimize governments’ inability 
to meet voters’ expectations. 
The Malian government follows this 
logic of the “evacuation” of endogenous 
sociopolitical factors when it portrays the 
crisis as an effect of a global phenomenon 
(terrorism) or when it attempts to reduce it 
to primarily exogenous problems afflicting 
Mali from Algeria and later Libya. The gov-
ernment stigmatizes all violent actors in 
Mali as “terrorists”, “barbarians” and “ani-
mals” (President Keïta), who lack rationality 
and must be fought with military means. As 
such, the government is shirking its respon-
sibility by ignoring the social and political 
aspects of the crisis. Paradoxically, the FC-
G5 dynamic has a similar impact. The FC 
may well reflect regional ownership, but 
seen from Bamako, it also helps to assuage 
and distract from outside and local con-
cerns about major challenges that are more 
national than regional: the stagnant peace 
process, the progressive take-over of the 
Mopti region by radical Islamists and gov-
ernance issues in Bamako, which all could 
have an impact on the 2018 presidential 
elections. 
Conclusion 
Strengthening local security forces is essen-
tial in the long term to ensure that local 
solutions take precedence over external 
actors, whose legitimacy in the region is 
weak and diminishing. Despite the strong 
pressure to “do something”, a nuanced and 
coherent approach to security sector assis-
tance should be pursued. 
While focusing on the development of 
military capacities for the Malian army and 
the G5, the (internal) political dimensions 
of the crisis should not be forgotten. Apart 
from the questionable practice of interna-
tional partners focusing their attention on 
the military rather than police and gendar-
merie, not all violent challengers of the 
Malian state are jihadists. And not all prob-
lems can be solved by repressive means. 
In Niger, opinion polls suggest that 
jihadism is perceived at most as a second-
ary issue. And in Mali, national debates 
show that many citizens see political dia-
logue with violent actors as an option. That 
notwithstanding, efforts to strengthen local 
security forces should take the political con-
text more seriously than has been the case 
so far with tactically oriented capacity-
building. 
Fostering a still hesitant debate on 
security sector reform, cooperating with 
drivers of a reform discourse, and patient 
efforts to persuade the government of the 
reform agenda should complement and in 
the medium term replace capacity-building 
– even if this will meet with resistance: in 
Mali and among international partners. 
Their own credibility depends on the fact 
that German, European and international 
players seek dialogue with each other and, 
above all, with Malian partners. Ultimately 
the aim should be bring the countless ini-
tiatives together in a coordinated and re-
form-oriented approach that seeks struc-
tural changes and promotes the legitimacy 
of the security forces and thus of the state. 
Mali is far from unique in this regard, but 
that does not make the challenge less urgent. 
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